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 In the interwar years, government officials of Japan began to express concerns 
about the absence of any specific unemployment data and were receptive to the 
recommendation of the International Labour Oﬃce that the problem of unemployment 
should be subject to systematic investigation. Two surveys were conducted by the 
government, Unemployment Statistical Survey of 1925 and the 1930 Census, but they 
just revealed relatively low unemployment rates.
 Contemporary critics knew that the data failed to capture issues such as over-
employment and the capacity of many individuals out of work to escape any survey 
count. There was some oﬃcial recognition of such deﬁciencies in the decision from 1929 
to initiate monthly returns on the numbers unemployed in each prefecture. Despite the 
fact that these data were also considered fraught both in method and coverage they 
nonetheless quickly became regarded as representative of the trend of unemployment in 
1930s Japan.
 On the basis of the available evidence, we have drawn attention to the paucity of 
contemporary data, how it lead to spasmodic attempts at improving the unemployment 
count and to the sources of monthly data upon which aggregate ﬁgures were produced 
and have been used internationally by labour organization or scholars since which 
distorted the reality of Japan’s interwar unemployment.
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1  Introduction
 For most European countries the basis upon which contemporaries and subsequent 
historians have determined the scale and the intensity of unemployment in the interwar 
period and the appropriateness of the authorities’responses to trade cycle movements 
has been from data derived from oﬃcial agencies. Although it is well established that 
aggregate unemployment statistics provide an imperfect measure of the phenomenon 
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in most industrialized countries, Eichengreen and Hatton, reviewing European and 
American experience between the wars, remarked that ‘it is of some comfort that 
we have available a comprehensive analysis of the sources, characteristics and 
comparatively of the statistics generated by public agencies and private bodies during 
the interwar years.’＊1
 Most of this data derives from the operation of compulsory unemployment insurance 
schemes which obliged workers officially categorized as unemployed to register 
themselves for the purpose of obtaining beneﬁt. One notable exception was France. Its 
low rate of unemployment in the 1930s derived from macroeconomic trends, the late 
emergence of a modern wage-earning class, and the implications of the rationalization 
movement in the 1930s for the volume of available work. None the less, a signiﬁcant 
part of explanation for this low rate of unemployment is definitional and conceptual, 
the significance of which is not lost on the Japanese case. Salais, reviewing French 
experience in the 1930s, notes that:
 The institutional preconditions for the pool of labour conforming to the conventional economic 
and social deﬁnition of ‘unemployed’ workers were not in place in France in the 1930s. The 
type of employment relationship that would give rise to the category ‘unemployment’ was not 
yet prevalent outside large towns and rationalized ﬁrms. This does not mean that individuals 
outside large towns and rationalized firms did not lose work and income due to the Great 
Depression, but that, due to the manner in which they appear to have been perceived, they were 
not regarded and tabulated as unemployed in the same manner as in the other countries. Neither 
did they regard themselves as unemployed in a modern sense of the word. ＊2
 Salais was at pains to emphasize that, despite the development of a uniform set of 
national regulations governing the provision of public assistance and the development 
within large enterprises of an increasingly sharp distinction between wage and salaried 
employment and unemployment, the low rate of unemployment in the 1930s did not fully 
capture the seriousness of contemporary conditions.
 
＊1  Eichengreen, B., and Hatton, T.J.,‘International Unemployment in International Perspec-
tive: An Overview’, Eichengreen, B., and Hatton, T.J., eds., International Unemployment in 
International Perspective, Dordrecht, 1988, p.5.
＊2 Salais, R., ‘Why was Unemployment so Low in France During the 1930s?’, in Ibid., p.247.
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 Similar definitional, institutional and conceptual problems arise in assessing the 
scale and distribution of interwar unemployment in Japan and the more so since even 
in France, unlike Japan, limited schemes of social and public insurance existed and 
eﬀorts were made to classify the unemployed in Census returns. Low levels of recorded 
unemployment dominate the Japanese interwar experience. However, it is the slowness 
with which the Japanese authorities engaged in eﬀort to ‘measure’ the contemporary 
unemployment problem and the vacuity of what data did emerge that we turn to in 
this chapter to demonstrate how fragile was the statistical basis upon which official 
responses to unemployment could be based.
2  The emergence of statistical surveys of the unemployed
 A signiﬁcant underpinning of when and to what extent authorities begin to ‘measure’ 
unemployment is when they perceive the problem to be worthy of such concern. Clearly 
workers in Japan were moving into and out of employment on a regular basis before 
the interwar period.  Their condition, reﬂecting Beveridge’s analysis of the emerging 
problem in Britain before 1914＊3, was recognized by most contemporaries as being less 
a matter of individual failings as much as a consequence of the ‘condition of industry’. 
H. Seki, a professor at the Tokyo College of Commerce and later Mayor of Osaka city, 
wrote of the Japanese unemployment problem in 1910:
 Apart from seasonal work considerable fluctuations in demand for labour arise from the 
trade cycle.  In addition, technological developments and improvements in industrial organization 
also result in the dismissal of many workers. There are workers, too, who are unable to obtain 
jobs because of the imperfect functioning of the labour market. Much of the unemployment 
problem arises from such cases and not from the fault of workers. ＊4
 Such pronouncements were rare and contemporary bureaucrats continue to ascribe 
loss of work principally to the irresponsibility of workers. There is some evidence 
nonetheless of a slight change in attitude in pre-1914 Japan. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, 
principal contributors to the Minority Report of the Royal Committee on the Poor Law 
 
＊3 Beveridge, W.H., Unemployment: A Problem of Industry, London, 1909.
＊4  Seki, H., ‘ Shisshoku Mondai (Sono 1), (Sono 2), Kokumin Keizai Zasshi Vol. 8., No. 5 and 
6 (May and June), 1910, pp. 2-3. [‘Unemployment Problems (1), (2) ’, Magazine of National 
Economy, Vol. 8., No. 5 and 6 (May and June), 1910, pp. 2-3.]
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in Britain in 1909, visited Japan in September 1911.  During their stay Sidney Webb 
lectured on the problem of poverty at the University of Waseda, describing the limits 
of the British Poor Law system and insisting that state intervention was required to 
sustain minimum national standards of living. ＊5  The Webbs’ book, The Prevention 
of Destitution ＊6 was translated into Japanese and published in February 1914. In the 
preface the Webbs wrote:
 There is no reason to believe that Japan cannot prevent the failures of policy seen in Britain. 
We are now struggling to abolish the Poor Law in Britain and it is fortunate that Japan does not 
have such a law for the support of the poor. The countries of the world should not repeat our 
failures by following British experience. ＊7 
 The Webbs were anxious to draw a distinction between administrative activity on 
behalf of the poor, which ideally should be carried out by local authorities, and that for 
the able-bodied unemployed whose condition should be treated by central government. 
It was important in their view for national governments to seek positively to prevent 
unemployment from emerging and then, if necessary, to seek to relieve the out-of-work 
by means other than those provided for under Poor Law regulations. ＊8 
 The Webbs’ visit to Japan stimulated a concern for the problem of poverty, including 
that arising from unemployment. They arrived ‘with excellent introductions from the 
Japanese Ambassador in London, and started to meet the outgoing Prime Minister, 
the vice-minister of foreign affairs, a financial magnate and a scattering of university 
professors. As they travelled through the country they were handsomely received, and 
they reciprocated with grace.’＊9  Although one cannot judge their impact directly, one 
 
＊5  Ogawa, M.,‘Taisho Demokurashii Ki no Kyuhin Taisei’, in Nihon Shakai Jigyo Daigaku 
Kyuhin Seido Kenkyu Kai ed., Nihon no Kyuhin Seido, Tokyo, 1986, pp.153-154. [Ogawa, M.,‘ 
The System for the Relief of Poverty in the Period of the Taisho Democracy’, in Seminar 
on the System for the Relief of Poverty, Japan Social Work University ed., The System for 
the Relief Of Poverty in Japan, Tokyo, 1986, pp.153-154.]
＊6  The title of this book was Kokumin Kyosai Ron,  which translates as National Co-opera-
tion Policy.
＊7  Webb, S., and B.,‘Nihon Yaku ni Fusuru Genchosha no Jo’, Kokumin Kyosai Ron, Tokyo, 
1914, p.1. [‘Authors’Preface for the Japanese Translation’, The Prevention of Destitution, 
Japanese version, Tokyo, 1914, p.1.]
＊8 Ibid., p.1.
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of the bureaucrats they met R. Ohno, subsequently to become Head of the Social Bureau 
in the interwar period, later recalled:
 Although bureaucrats in the Social Bureau were described as having a left-wing ideology 
and although the younger of these bureaucrats did attempt to do new things there was not a 
great deal of radical thought. But we became much inﬂuenced by Fabianism and by the books of 
Sidney Webb and Beveridge. ＊10
 Another contemporary bureaucrat interested in the Fabian Society recalled how 
he visited Sidney Webb in London to be told that the Japanese nation ‘should be 
evolutionary not revolutionary’.＊11 
 Such random references to an emerging concern with the problem of poverty and 
its relation to unemployment are not indicative of any substantial movement in that 
direction. A series of articles on poverty and unemployment appeared in the leading 
newspaper at the time, Osaka Asahi, during September and October 1916 and were 
subsequently published as a book The Story of Poverty, which drew upon the academic 
writings of both Booth and Rowntree.  But there were few indications that government 
oﬃcials felt any need to recast Japanese policy in a British mirror. 
 The Japanese government established a Committee on Relief Works in June 1918, 
not as part of any fundamental rethink on poverty and unemployment but as a response 
to their fear that wartime inﬂation was likely to substantially reduce workers’ living 
standards and thereby threaten social unrest in peacetime. An indication of the scale of 
the problem as they perceived it is given below.
 What aﬀected workers most directly was the rapid rise in the price of rice, which 
lead to national riots during August 1918.  The number of strikes in 1919 rose to 497 
 
＊9  MacKenzie,  N. and J., eds., The Diary of Beatrice Webb, Volume Three, 1905-1924,‘The 
Power to Alter Things’, London, 1984, p. 168.
＊10  Koseisho Shakaikyoku, Shakaikyoku 30 Nen, Tokyo, 1950, p.24, [Social Bureau of Ministry 
of Welfare, The 30-Year History of the Social Bureau, Tokyo, 1950, p.24.]
＊11 Ibid., p.23.
＊12  Rodosho, Rodo Gyoseishi, Vol.1., Tokyo, 1961, p.118. [Ministry of Labour, The History of La-
bour Administration, Vol.1, Tokyo, 1961, p.118.]
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involving 63,137 people compared with 108 involving 8,413 in 1916. ＊12 Not only had the 
number of disputes risen they were now planned systematically and involved picketing 
and sabotage. ＊13
 This tendency increased after the Armistice. What the Japanese authorities feared 
most was the militancy of the workers which, as Large notes, ‘ﬂowed from the impact 
of the post-war recession on Japan. This caused a precipitous decline in production and a 
corresponding unemployment crisis.’＊14
 The Committee on Relief Works established just two months before outbreak 
of the Rice Riots was not confined to the problem of unemployment; it included 
representatives of the Ministries of the Home Oﬃce, Law, Education, Agriculture and 
Commerce ＊15 who examined issues as varied as the conditions of the retail market, 
improvement in the housing of the poor, and policies for fostering co-operation between 
labour and capital. ＊16  None the less the likelihood of unemployment in the immediate 
period prompted calls for the government to take a more systematic and informed view 
of labour problems. ＊17  Delegates to the conference on the formation of the League of 
Nations from Britain, the United States, France, Italy, and Japan had also urged action 
 
＊13 Ibid., pp. 118-119.
＊14  Large, S. S., Organized Workers and Socialist Politics in Interwar Japan, Cambridge, 1981, 
p.28.
＊15 Ibid., p.131.
＊16  Tsuchiana, F., Shakai Seisaku Seidoshi Ron, Kyoto, 1990, p.426, [Tsuchiana, F., History of 
the Institute for Social Policy, Kyoto, 1990, p.426.]
＊17 Rodosho, op.cit., pp.127-128. [Ministry of Labour, op.cit., pp.127-128.]
Table 1  Indices of wages and prices, 1916-1920
Year Wages Wholesale Price Retail Price
1916 153 155 155
1917 181 195 208
1918 224 255 261
1919 304 312 310
1920 405 343 361
Rodosho, Rodo Gyoseishi, Tokyo, 1961, p.122. [Ministry of Labour, The History of 
Labour Administration, Tokyo, 1961, p.122.]
(Wage and wholesale price, 1900=100, average of total wages in Tokyo surveyed 
by Tokyo Chamber of Commerce); retail price, 1904=100, index of Tokyo, surveyed 
by Bank of Tokyo)
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in this area. ＊18 
 It was in response to the discussion on post-war unemployment held during the 
First International Labour Conference in 1919-1920 that the Opposition Kensei-party 
submitted an Unemployment Insurance Bill to the 45th Parliamentary Session in October 
1921.＊19  The Bill failed.  T. Maeda, a Home Oﬃce bureaucrat who made a research trip 
to Europe and the United States between May 1918 and October 1919, subsequently 
submitted a report to the Home Oﬃce entitled Policies for Preventing Unemployment. 
In it he urged consideration of policies for a compulsory unemployment insurance and 
dedicated public works on behalf of the unemployed.＊20  Such recommendations went 
far beyond what the central authorities thought necessary at the time. In the search 
for systematic data on the labour market Japanese authorities were content merely 
to respond to the recommendation of the International Labour Oﬃce in 1919 that the 
Employment Exchange system be expanded, a response which the authorities sustained 
for years thereafter as the following table illustrates:
 What is interesting is that such seemingly passive reaction by the authorities 
disguised the less publicized attention that was already being devoted to social 
problems in general which, though not exclusively related to unemployment, none the 
 
＊18  Rodo Mondai ni Kansuru Shitumon Syuisho, cited in Ibid., p.132. [A Prospectus on Labour 
Problems, cited in Ibid., p.132.]
＊19  Rodosho Shokugyo Anteikyoku Shitugyo Hokenka eds., Shitugyo Hoken 10 Nen Shi, Tokyo, 
1960, pp.98-105. [Department of Unemployment, Bureau of Employment Stabilisation, Min-
istry of Labour, The 10-Year History of Unemployment Insurance, Tokyo, 1960, pp. 98-105.]
Table 2  Number of employment exchanges, 1921-1929
Year Oﬃcial Private Total Year Oﬃcial Private Total
1921 31 18 49 1930 268 39 307
1922 79 27 106 1931 372 49 421
1923 103 32 135 1932 419 43 462
1924 130 45 175 1933 482 36 518
1925 141 40 181 1934 550 37 587
1926 146 41 187 1935 636 41 677
1927 174 38 212 1936 657 40 697
1928 190 37 227 1937 717 28 745
1929 217 39 256
Rodosho, Rodo Gyoseishi, Tokyo, 1961, p.559. [Ministry of Labour, The History of Labour 
Administration, Tokyo, 1961, p.559.]
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less provided a basis upon which unemployment ameliorative policy was subsequently 
based. Though much of this concern initially rose outside of government, the authorities 
frequently lent their support to it in the hope of improving their sources of information 
on the workings of the labour market. At the end of December 1919, for example, the 
Kyocho-kai Co-operative Foundation was established, supported by government oﬃcials 
such as T. Tokonami, Minister of the Home Oﬃce, I. Tokugawa, Chairman of the House 
of Lords,  I. Ohoka, Chairman of the House of Commons, and by a leading entrepreneur E. 
Shibusawa. ＊21 The Foundation published the organ Social Reform (Shakai Seisaku Jiho) 
through which bureaucrats, scholars, and politicians debated labour problems, including 
those of emerging unemployment, and the issue of how to divide responsibility for the 
solution of such problems between the private and public sectors. On its inception the 
Foundation noted in August 1919:
 The co-operation between capital and labour is the most important thing for the development 
of industry and for maintaining the peace of society. However this is easy to say but diﬃcult 
to achieve. The government should intervene if necessary and entrepreneurs should respect 
the dignity of workers. Workers as well should undergo training to improve their situation. 
The purpose of this Foundation is not to undertake social policy ourselves but to research the 
beneﬁts and defects of policies aimed at improving the relationship between capital and labour 
and to make recommendations to government and public bodies. We should survey what our 
country needs from a neutral point of view and open our membership to various sections of 
society in order that many people can help us to promote national development according to the 
needs of our time. ＊22 
 The ﬁrst article to appear in Social Reform on the subject of unemployment stressed 
the need to recognize unemployment as a problem related to poverty whose origins and 
 
＊20  Kanazawa, F.,‘Nihon ni Okeru Shitugyo Hoken no Seiritu Katei (2) -Sengo Nihon no 
Shakaihoken Shiso no Genten-’, Tokyo Daigaku Shakaikagaku Kenkyusho, Shakaikagaku 
Kenkyu, Vol. XXXVII, No.6, March 1986, pp.76-77. [ Kanazawa, F.,‘The Finance Ministry 
Deposit Bureau’s Loans to Local Governments during the Interwar Period (2)’, Institute 
of Social Science, University of Tokyo,  The Journal of Social Science, Vol. XXXVII, No.6, 
March 1986, pp.76-77.]
＊21  Rodosho, op.cit., p.154. [Ministry of Labour, op.cit., p.154.]
＊22  Kyocho Kai, Zaidan Hojin Kyocho Kai Setsuritsu Syuisho, 2 August, 1919,  Shakai Seisaku 
Jiho, No.1, September 1920. [The Prospectus on the Establishment of Kyocho-kai, 2 August, 
1919, Social Reform, No. 1, 1920.]
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amelioration need speciﬁc analysis. Its author K. Tano complained that:
 Conventional economics has been keen to concentrate on the study of wealth but has tended 
to forget that many men are prevented by the workings of the economy from earning a living 
despite the materialistic pressure put upon them. What a sad thing it is when the person has 
the ability to work and has the desire to work but cannot do so for reasons which are not his 
fault. ＊23
 This sentiment was akin to that subsequently noted by Harris who, reviewing 
developments in pre-1914 Britain, has argued:
 The unemployed themselves, though still not free from personal moral censure, were 
increasingly regarded as victims of structural and cultural forces which were in turn viewed as 
being, if not wholly controllable, at least susceptible to political intervention and adaptation. ＊24
 When Tano acknowledged that part of the diﬃculty in reacting to unemployment lay 
in the scarcity of any reliable data on the problem, he was fully aware that at the time 
no oﬃcial eﬀort had been made or was planned to improve on the situation. ＊25 Unlike 
other countries Japan lacked any systematic data from trade unions, any longstanding 
system of Employment Exchange data collection and, as noted already, any compulsory 
insurance scheme capable of producing regular disaggregated statistics at national and 
local level. ＊26 This was not, however, an insuperable problem because action on behalf of 
unemployed had not always been based on ﬁrm statistical analysis.  Harris’s review of 
the treatment of unemployment in Edwardian Britain underlines the point:
 In spite of the growth of empirical investigation, the evidence relating to all aspects of 
 
＊23  Tano, K.,‘Situgyo Mondai oyobi Wagakuni Genji no Situgyo Jotai’, Shakai Seisaku Jiho, No. 
2, October, 1920, p.81. [Tano, K.,‘The Unemployment Problem and the Recent Condition 
of Unemployment in Our Country’, Social Reform, No. 2, October, 1920, p.81.]
＊24  Harris, J.,‘From Sunspots to Social Welfare: The Unemployment Problem 1870-1914’, in 
Corry, B., ed., Unemployment and the Economists, Cheltenham, 1996, p.53.
＊25  Tano, op.cit., pp.81-82.
＊26  Yusa, T.,‘Wagakuni Saisho no Shitugyo Chosa (Jou)’, Shakai Seisaku Jiho, No. 45, 1924, p.77. 
[Yusa, T., ‘The First Survey on the Unemployment in Our Country (1)’, Social Reform, 
No. 45, 1924, p.77.]
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the problem of unemployment was highly imperfect for most of the period under discussion 
and more reliable information only became available as a result of and not as a prelude to 
administrative reforms. In the interim the discussion of unemployment and the theories on which 
reforms were based, were derived partly from very limited statistical data and partly from 
highly conjectural preconceptions about the nature of the labour market and the characteristics 
of the unemployed. ＊27
 The discussion of unemployment in interwar Japan was likewise derived from very 
limited statistical data. Subsequent information never became as reliable as that which 
followed upon administrative reform in other industrial nations. For the greater part of 
the 1920s the Japanese authorities’ response to unemployment continued to be fashioned 
against the background of limited empirical investigation and partial survey data that 
contemporaries readily acknowledged to be unreliable.
 Unemployment data were collected in Kobe in September 1923 following the survey 
of its declining fortunes. Kobe as a large port had witnessed increased trade during 
wartime but suﬀered a substantial decline in activity in immediate aftermath of war. In 
1921 workers went on strike at the Kawasaki-Mitsubishi Shipyard, one of the leading 
shipyards in Japan at that time and  ‘marched for days outside the company gates 
protesting against unemployment and the dismissal of key union leaders, and sang songs 
such as ‘Rise up, ye labourers, rise up, capture the strongholds of capitalism.’＊28  The 
local authorities were not entirely unmoved. In January, 1923 a Temporary Survey 
of Unemployment in Kobe City was undertaken by the Social Department of Hyogo 
Prefecture. This was the ﬁrst statistical survey on unemployment in Japan. Although 
the extent of the survey was limited to within the city, it recorded 5,061 unemployed 
(male 4,496) among 150,000 labourers and salaried workers. ＊29 A similar survey of 
local unemployment was conducted by the Social Department of Osaka Prefecture in 
February 1924 revealing 840 unemployed among about 50,000 male workers. ＊30    
 
＊27 Harris, J., Unemployment and Politics, Oxford, 1972, p.47.
＊28  Large, S.S., op.cit., p.29.
＊29  Hyogoken Shakaika, Rinji Shitsugyo Chosa Hokoku, 1924, collected in Kase, K., ed., Sen-
zenki Shitugyo Tokei Syusei, Vol.3., Tokyo, 1998. [Department of Society, Hyogo Prefecture, 
Temporary Survey of Unemployment in Kobe City, 1924, collected in Kase, K., ed., Collected 
Unemployment Statistics in Pre-war Japan, Vol.3., Tokyo, 1998]
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3  The contemporary debate over unemployment statistics
 The data which existed at a more general level, such as from industrial 
establishments, only related to factories employing more than 50 workers. Employment 
Exchanges had only been established in 1921, were patchy in their geographical 
coverage and had not from the outset developed any systematic means of compiling 
statistical returns. ＊31  The Home Oﬃce had established a Social Bureau in November 
1923 but its statistical department was meager, though there is evidence that oﬃcials 
welcomed the initiatives undertaken in Kobe and Osaka however limited in extent and 
nature. ＊32  It was only in 1925 as a result of administrative reform that an independent 
Bureau of Statistics was established.＊33  Until then unemployment surveys had remained 
local and spasmodic. T Maeda, Japanese delegate to the  2nd International Conference 
of Labour Statistics in Geneva in April 1925, announced his government’s intention of 
surveying unemployment conditions within the principal industrial cities in Japan and 
urged other countries without regular sources of data to undertaken similar survey 
investigations as a basis for formulating policy.
 Following the establishment of the independent Bureau of Statistics in April 
1925 the central authorities began to consider how best to improve their sources of 
unemployment data. The Bureau explained its position in October 1925:
 Recently the number of the unemployed has increased gradually because of continuous 
depression and as a result solving the unemployment problem has become urgent. However, we 
do not have any adequate unemployment statistics as a basis for policy. Because the plan for an 
independent Bureau of Statistics emerged suddenly, many procedural issues remain unresolved. 
We have studied the situation in European and American countries and have begun to consider 
 
＊30  Osakafu Shakaika, Osaka Shokugyo Hodokai, Taisho 13 Nen 2 Gatsu Osakafu niokeru 
Shitsugyo Chosa Hokoku Gaiyo, 1925, collected in Ibid. [Department of Society, Osaka Pre-
fecture and Osaka Employment Guidance Association, Report on the Unemployment Survey 
in Osaka in February 1923, 1925, collected in Ibid.]
＊31  Hyogo Ken Shakaika, op.cit., p.1., in Kase, K., ed., Ibid., p.334. [Department of Society, the 
Prefecture of Hyogo, op.cit., p.1, collected in Kase, K. ed., Ibid., p. 334.]
＊32  Yusa, T.,‘Wagakuni Saisho no Shitsugyo Chosa (Jou) (Ge)’, Shakai Seisaku Jiho, No.45 and 
No.46, 1924. [Yusa, T.,‘The First Unemployment Investigation in Our Country (I) (II)’, So-
cial Reform, No.45 and No.46, 1924.
＊33 Rodosho, op.cit., pp.193-194. [Ministry of Labour, op.cit., pp.193-194.]
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cautiously the condition of unemployment in our own country. ＊34
 Despite this meagre advance it became clear from the outset that the Social Bureau 
of Home Office and the Statistical Bureau had very different ideas as to what was 
thought to be necessary. The Social Bureau wanted a national survey of unemployment 
not merely to produce aggregate numbers but also to attempt some classification of 
the diﬀerent characteristics of the unemployed. The Statistical Bureau claimed that it 
had neither the budget nor the skills required to complete such a task. What followed 
instead was a survey in 1925 of 24 speciﬁed cities to include the six largest cities where 
it was believed most unemployment was concentrated. ＊35 
 Despite the limitations and reliability of the data thereby collected, the survey at 
least prompted discussions of the most appropriate definition of the unemployed and 
the extent to which existing statistical returns could properly be used as a basis for 
policy making. The definition of the unemployed in this survey was limited to those 
who had had previous experience of work but who had no job on the day of the survey; 
those seeking work for the ﬁrst time but unable to ﬁnd it were therefore excluded. The 
distinction between casual workers and the unemployed remained ambiguous. 
 However anxious the Statistical Bureau was to offer up a formal definition of 
unemployment and to supply more raw data, its activity only reinforced the view that, 
 
＊34  Naikaku Tokei Kyokucho, Taisho 14 Nen Kokusei Chosa oyobi Shitugyo Tokei Chosa Jimu 
Keika Gaiyo, 28 October, 1925, compiled in Sorifu Tokeikyoku, Sorifu Tokeikyoku Hyaku 
Nen Shi Shiryo Syusei, Vol.1, Tokyo, 1983, p.875. [The Head of the Statistical Bureau of 
the Cabinet, Outline of the Administrative Procedures of  the 1925 Census Survey and the 
Statistical Survey on Unemployment, 28 October, 1925, compiled in Bureau of Statistics, the 
Prime Minister’s Oﬃce, Compiled Sources of the 100-Year History of the Statistical Bureau 
of the Prime Minister’s Oﬃce, Vol.1, Tokyo, 1983, p.875.]
＊35  Nakaku Tokeikyoku, Taisho 14 Nen Shitsugyo Tokei Chosa Sokuho, 1924, collected in 
Kase, K., ed., Senzen Ki Shitugyo Tokei Syusei, Vol.1., Tokyo, 1998. [Bureau of Statistics, 
A Prompt Report on the Unemployment Statistics Investigation in 1924, 1924, collected 
in Kase, K., ed., Collected Unemployment Statistics in Pre-war Japan, Vol.1, Tokyo, 1998. ] 
The data was later published in detail in 2 volumes. Naikaku Tokeikyoku, Taisho 14 Nen 
Shitsugyo Tokei Chosa Hokoku, Vol.1 Description, 1927. [Bureau of Statistics, Report of Un-
employment Statistics Investigation, Vol. 1 Description, 1927.] and Vol. 2 Kekkahyo, 1925. 
[Vol. 2 Table, 1925.]. Both are collected in Ibid.
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by any international standard, Japanese unemployment rates were relatively low. The 
Japanese Economist, reviewing the statistical survey of October 1925, commented:
 The number of the working population in the principal 21 cities and important mining areas 
and their vicinities in 16 prefectures was about 2,355,000, and among them the unemployed 
numbered 105,500, that is, an unemployment rate 4.4%. When we compare this ﬁgure with the 
European counterpart of around 10%, it is, despite recent economic depression, unexpectedly 
low.＊36
 Similar sentiments emerged from the 1930 Census Survey which identiﬁed a class 
of ‘unemployed’. Out of a total population of 29,619,640 (19,030,237 male and 10,589,403 
female) the number of unemployed was recorded at 319,813 (290,737 male and 29,076 
female); a total unemployment rate of 1.08% (1.53% male and 0.27% female). ＊37  Kase 
has claimed that there was a lasting image in pre-1939 Japan that ‘the number of the 
unemployed was about 300,000 and the unemployment rate about 1%’ derived largely 
from the evidence of the 1930 Census Survey. ＊38 
 The contrast with other nations was obvious. As Nakamura has written:
 Even in ‘the bottom’ of the 1920s, the Japanese economy did not stop developing. There 
were some years in which the growth rate of real GDP fell to minus (1920-22, 1926-27, and 
1930-31). However when we look at the whole interwar period (1926-37), the average growth rate 
of real productivity of industries was 6.8% a year, and this ﬁgure was far higher than that of 
Germany (1.4%), Great Britain (1.5%), Italy (2.0%), the United States (2.9%) and the Soviet Union 
(4.5%). In the Great Depression, the recovery of productivity in Japan was more rapid than in 
any other Euro-American country. Japan unlike them did not face high unemployment rates. ＊39
 
＊36  ‘Yosougai no Shitugyosha Jisuu’, Ekonomisuto, 1 January, 1926, p.11. [‘Unexpectedly Few 
Number of Unemployed’, Economist (Japanese), 1 January, 1926, p.11.]
＊37  Naikaku Tokeikyoku, Showa 5 Nen Kokusei Chosa, Dai 2 Kan (Zenkoku Hen), 1930. [Bureau 
of Statistics, 1930 Census Survey, Vol. 2 (National Edition), 1930.] collected in Kase, K., ed., 
Senzen Ki Shitugyo Tokei Syusei, Vol.4., Tokyo, 1998. [Kase, K., ed., Collected Unemploy-
ment Statistics in Pre-war Japan, Vol.4, Tokyo, 1998.]
＊38  Kase, K.,‘Kaidai: Senzen Nihon no Shitugyo Tokei‒Sono Suii to Tokucho’, Kase, K., ed., 
Senzen Ki Shitugyo Tokei Syusei, Vol.1., Tokyo, 1998, p. 17. [Kase, K.,‘Explanation of Un-
employment Statistics in Pre-war Japan -Their Changes and Characteristics’, in Kase, K., 
ed., Collected Unemployment Statistics in Pre-war Japan, Vol. 1, Tokyo, 1998, p. 17.]
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 In similar vein Kazahaya, in the book-length study of Japanese social policy in 1930s 
published in 1937, acknowledged that the 1925 statistical survey had publicized an 
unemployment rate of nearly 4.5% for salaried workers, ordinary workers, and casual 
labourers in total and that this level was much smaller than anticipated.  This was 
especially so when compared to evidence of the German Research Institute on Economic 
Cycles which showed an unemployment rate among trade union members of between 
6% and 19.4% during the period 1926-January 1927 and with a widely publicized average 
unemployment rate in Britain of around 10% of insured workers. ＊40
 There were some contemporary observers in Japan, however, who were anxious 
to correct the image created by the raw statistical data. Some commentaries were 
doubtless superﬁcial and diﬃcult to evaluate. S.Shiroyama, recalling depression in Japan 
during the world slump, has written of ‘cities filled with the unemployed who had 
insuﬃcient money to catch a train. Many of them had to walk to their home towns.’＊41
 Conscious that the ‘revealed’ rate of unemployment had a direct bearing on the 
scale and intensity of government administrative policy, Odabashi, writing in 1933, 
attempted in a very basic way to determine the extent of aggregate unemployment. 
Having calculated the working population from the 1930 Census Survey (total number 
of workers divided by total number of population) and presuming the proportion not to 
have changed down to 1930, Odabashi compared the number of workers who declared 
themselves as ‘in employment’ in 1930 with those constituting the working population 
in 1920 as the proxy for those similarly classiﬁed in 1930. He regarded the diﬀerence 
as equivalent to a form of ‘disguised unemployment’ in the sense that those recorded 
as unemployed in the 1930 survey merely referred to people who were prepared 
to describe themselves thus. However, Odabashi judged that many workers both in 
 
＊39  Nakamura, T., and Odaka,K.,‘Gaisetu : 1914-1937’in Nakamura, T., and Odaka, K., eds., Ni-
hon Keizai Shi Vol.6, Niju Kozo, Tokyo, 1989, pp.31-32. [Nakamura, T., and Odaka, K.,‘The 
Outline ; 1914-1937’, in Nakamura and Odaka eds., The Japanese Economic History Vol.6, 
The Dual Structure, Tokyo, 1989, pp.31-32.]
＊40  Kazahaya, Y., Nihon Shakai Seisaku Shi, Tokyo, 1937, pp.302-303. [Kazahaya, Y., The His-
tory of Japanese Social Policy, Tokyo, 1937, pp.302-303.]
＊41  Shiroyama, S.,‘Tsusan Kanryo Jinbutsu Shoshi’ S. Shiroyama,’Chuo Koron, August, 1975, 
pp.303-319. [‘The Short History of the Bureaucrats of the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry’, Chuo Koron, August, 1975, pp.303-319.]
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1920 and in 1930 simply left the labour market when faced with economic depression 
returning to their homes or perhaps to work on the land.
 The government had no means oﬃcially of recognizing such people as unemployed 
even though they constituted a proportion of those of working age who desired work. 
Odabashi found that on his calculation some 2.37 million people not classiﬁed oﬃcially 
as unemployed in the survey might none the less be seeking work. This was some 
seven and a half times the total recorded as unemployed by the Statistical Bureau in 
1930. ＊42 Kazahaya subsequently pointed out that Odabashi’s estimate was probably on 
the low side on the grounds that he had not included those of working age in 1920 who 
were actually unemployed. Without substantiating his calculation Kazahaya suggested 
that the number actually out of work in 1930 could be over 3 million, equivalent to an 
unemployment rate in Japan of around 10%, suﬃcient to overturn the popular image of 
low unemployment in the country. ＊43 
 Such fundamental revisionism has not gone unchallenged. Odaka, analysing the 
Japanese labour market in the 1930s, has oﬀered an equally speculative but necessary 
corrective to Odabashi by redeﬁning the working population to exclude from those of 
 
＊42  Odabashi, S.,‘Waga Kuni no Syugyo Jinko to Shitugyo narabini Sono Shorai’, Shakai Sei-
saku Jiho, Number 157, October, 1933, p.38.] [Odabashi, S.,‘The Working Population and 
Unemployment and Their Future in Our Country’, Social Reform, Number 157, October, 
1933, p.38.]
  see also Odaka, K., Rodoshijo Bunseki, Tokyo, pp.144-147, Tokyo, 1984. [Odaka, K., The 
Japanese Labour Market, Tokyo, 1984, pp.144-147.]
＊43 Kazahaya, op.cit., pp.278-279.
Table 3  Estimated unemployment rates for male workers, selected years 1920-40
Item / Year 1920 1930 1940
(a) Population (000s) 28,044 32,390 34,590
(b) Age 0-5 (000s) 4,446 5,362 5,478
(c) Age Over 70 (000s) 688 742 751
(d) Numbers in Education (000s) 4,963 6,042 7,513
(e) Estimated Number of Workforce of Working  Age (000s) 17,947 20,244 20,848
(f) Number of Workers (000s) 17,081 19,030 19,599
(g) Estimated Number of the Unemployed (000s) = (e) ‒ (f) 866 1,214 1,249
(h) Estimated Unemployment Rate (%) 4.83 6.00 5.99
Odaka,K., Rodoshijo Bunseki, Tokyo, 1984, p.148. [Odaka, K., The Japanese Labour Market, 
Tokyo, 1984, p.148.]
92（92）
Annual Research Bulletin of Osaka Sangyo University
working age seeking employment people who were in education. If, Odaka argues, the 
total numbers of working age are thus redeﬁned in a way that Odabashi failed to do and 
are compared crudely with the number of workers declared as employed in the Census 
Surveys the results produce an unemployment rate of some 6% for the 1930s as a whole. 
The basis of the calculation is given below:
 Odaka is fully aware that such a crude estimates do not capture the complexity of 
the Japanese labour market. Although such an exercise might temper views that Japan 
actually suﬀered unemployment rate of some 10%, crude calculations of a lower order 
do not necessarily reﬂect the diﬃculties that still exist in determining the real nature of 
Japanese interwar unemployment. ＊44 
Part of a problem lies in the co-existence of a relatively low rate of unemployment 
alongside evidence of an oversupply of labour. The relationship between the number 
of persons seeking jobs (V1) and the number of vacancies (V2) in interwar Japan is 
indicated below:
 If, as indicated, there was a greater proportion of workers seeking jobs than were 
thought to be available against the background of relatively low unemployment, the 
suggestion is that the otherwise unemployed were absorbed elsewhere in the economy. 
The implication of Odaka’s work is that the diﬀerence in the number of those in the 
ages 25-60 in employment and the estimated total working population represented the 
scale of unemployment. 
Table 4   Proportion of the number of persons seeking jobs (V1) and the 
number of vacancies (V2), 1921-1939
V1/V2
Year Male Female Total
1921-25 1.067 0.374 0.947
1923-27 1.169 0.508 1.029
1925-29 1.310 0.646 1.137
1927-31 1.444 0.765 1.216
1929-33 1.448 0.835 1.201
1931-35 1.274 0.768 1.048
1933-37 1.042 0.634 0.865
1935-39 0.834 0.548 0.723
Odaka,K., Rodoshijo Bunseki, Tokyo, 1984,  p.154. [ Odaka, K., The Japanese Labour 
Market, Tokyo, 1984, p.154.]
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 Even so the unemployment rate in interwar Japan did not rise to anything like 
European levels nor were there substantial increases in the rate during the worst 
years of the world slump. To a large extent this reﬂected the existence of a dual labour 
market. Although workers’wages declined as a consequence of economic depression 
there was a considerable amount of concealed employment with workers kept in jobs 
beyond the point justified by the relationship between marginal productivity and the 
ruling wage. Moreover, during recession surplus labour was absorbed by individual 
entrepreneurs or accepted for work at low wages, particularly in agricultural areas. 
It was this dual structure which was inadequately represented by surveys of the 
unemployed such as that of 1925 which concentrated attention on industrialized cities.＊45 
 The Japanese Economist argued in this vein in 1927, emphasising that the 
government’s definition of unemployment was too narrow and ignored the hidden 
unemployed concluding that total unemployment in Japan in 1928 were likely to be in 
a region of 800,000～900,000 ＊46 and in 1930 around 1,300,000. ＊47 Given that the total 
number of unemployed was officially estimated on 1 April 1930 to be 372,127 (5.25%) 
the implication of the Economist’s analysis was that government data were capturing 
merely one-third of those actually out of work. ＊48  Similar upward estimates were made 
in 1934. T. Minoguchi, writing in Social Reform, even suggested that Odabashi’s previous 
estimate of 2.3 million unemployed in 1930 might not be too great an exaggeration. ＊49 
 None of these reﬂective views on the dual labour market in Japan appeared much 
 
＊44 Odaka, op.cit., pp.154-155.
＊45  Odaka, K.,‘Niju Kozo’, in Nakamura, T., and Odaka, K., eds., Nihon Keizai Shi Vol.6, Niju 
Kozo, Tokyo, 1989, p.152. [Odaka, K.,‘The Dual Structure’, in Nakamura, T., and Odaka, K., 
eds., Japanese Economic History Vol.6, Dual Structure, Tokyo, 1989, p.152.]
＊46 ‘ Waga Kuni no Shitugyosha wa Ikura Aruka’, Ekonomisuto, 5 October, 1929, pp.28-31. 
[‘How many unemployed does our country have?’, Economist (Japanese), 5 October, 1929, 
pp.28-31.]
＊47  ‘Nihon no Shitugyoshasousuu Hyaku Niju Man Nin Toppa’, Ekonomisuto, 15 July, 1930, 
pp.10-14. [‘The number of unemployed in Japan is over 1,200,000’, Economist (Japanese), 15 
July, 1930, pp.10-14.]
＊48 Ibid., p.13.
＊49  Minoguchi, T.,‘Wagakuni Genka no Shitugyo Ryo no Sokutei’, Shakai Seisaku Jiho, Num-
ber 162, March 1934. [Minoguchi, T.,‘Estimation of the Number of the Unemployed in 
Present Japan’, Social Reform, Number 162, March 1934.]
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in contemporary reports on the state of unemployment. It is true that the Hamaguchi 
cabinet of the Minsei party expressed concern in July 1929 over the paucity of 
unemployment data. One result was the decision of the Social Bureau of the Home 
Oﬃce to demand henceforth monthly estimates of unemployment from regional heads 
in each prefecture. These returns continued from September 1929 to 1939 covering 
three separate categories of workers- salaried workers, casual workers and other 
workers. There was no eﬀort to establish the characteristics of unemployment in terms 
of duration or age structure.  Contemporaries regarded this series merely as a detailed 
indication of changes in the numbers unemployed but not as a credible basis on which 
to judge the labour market situation with any great conﬁdence.  On the basis of these 
returns, as the tables below indicate, the rate of unemployment in Japan at the depth of 
depression in 1932 was put at 6.88%. In the same year, however, the casual labourers’ 
unemployment rate stood at 11.59%, salaried workers’ at 4.89%, and ‘other workers’ at 
5.61%. 






Average for the Year)
Unemployed  Rate of Unemployment(%)
1929 6,798,777 294,095 4.33
1930 7,012,598 366,799 5.23
1931 6,976,072 413,250 5.92
1932 7,109,347 489,168 6.88
1933 7,300,213 413,853 5.67
1934 7,473,066 374,318 5.01
1935 7,658,396 356,557 4.66
1936 7,843,011 340,855 4.35
1937 7,957,873 299,541 3.76
1938 7,938,449 241,901 3.05
1939 8,315,211 188,820 2.27
Rodosho, Rodo Gyoseishi, Tokyo, 1961, pp.1276-1277. [Ministry of Labour, The History of Labour 
Administration, Tokyo, 1961, pp.1276-7.]
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Table 6   Estimated number of the unemployed and the rate of unemployment 
(salaried workers), 1929-1939 
Year
Total
Population Surveyed Unemployed Rate of Unemployment(%)
1929 1,603,975 61,732 3.85
1930 1,649,753 72,913 4.42
1931 1,648,228 70,595 4.28
1932 1,674,965 81,978 4.89
1933 1,703,995 71,992 4.22
1934 1,728,914 68,546 3.96
1935 1,758,190 67,876 3.86
1936 1,813,006 67,157 3.70
1937 1,843,928 62,843 3.41
1938 1,869,005 54,088 2.89
1939 1,905,444 37,225 1.59
Rodosho, Rodo Gyoseishi, Tokyo, 1961, pp.1276-1277. [Ministry of Labour, The History of Labour 
Administration, Tokyo, 1961, pp.1276-7.]




Population Surveyed Unemployed Rate of Unemployment(%)
1929 1,544,424 109,848 7.11
1930 1,623,372 134,107 8.26
1931 1,646,614 162,400 9.86
1932 1,708,056 197,993 11.59
1933 1,780,645 189,941 10.67
1934 1,786,078 184,095 10.31
1935 1,801,847 173,266 9.62
1936 1,828,967 164,210 8.96
1937 1,843,029 142,774 7.75
1938 1,840,448 115,914 6.30
1939 1,775,466 95,931 5.40
Rodosho, Rodo Gyoseishi, Tokyo, 1961, pp.1276-1277. [Ministry of Labour, The History of Labour 
Administration, Tokyo, 1961, pp.1276-7.]
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 Outside observers were very sceptical as to the reliability of these data. The 
International Labour Review noted in 1930:
 The Bureau of Social Affairs has published monthly estimates of unemployment since 
September 1929…It was calculated that May 1930 there were 375,515 workers unemployed 
among 7,107,258 persons engaged in various industries, or 5.33 per cent. But much doubt has 
been expressed about the Bureau estimates because it is generally believed that on account of 
the world depression the actual industrial condition of the country is far worse than is suggested 
by the oﬃcial ﬁgures of unemployment＊50
 The Oriental Economist attacked the Bureau’s estimates as ‘fabricated statistics’.＊51 
The Japanese Economist likewise doubted the credibility of the data ＊52, doubts which 
were oﬃcially accepted by the Minister of Home Oﬃce. ＊53  M. Ando, an opposition MP, 




Population Surveyed Unemployed Rate of Unemployment(%)
1929 3,645,378 122,515 3.36
1930 3,739,473 159,780 4.27
1931 3,681,230 180,253 4.90
1932 3,726,326 209,197 5.61
1933 3,823,073 151,920 3.97
1934 3,958,074 121,677 3.07
1935 4,098,358 115,415 2.82
1936 4,201,038 109,488 2.61
1937 4,270,916 98,925 2.20
1938 4,228,829 71,898 1.70
1939 4,633,484 55,942 1.21
Rodosho, Rodo Gyoseishi, Tokyo, 1961, pp.1276-1277. [Ministry of Labour, The History of Labour 
Administration, Tokyo, 1961, pp.1276-7.]
 
＊50  Idei,S.,‘The Unemployment Problem in Japan’, International Labour Review, Vol. XXII, 
1930, p.507.
＊51 Toyo Keizai Shimpo, 17 May, 1930, p.1068.  [Oriental Economist, 17 May, 1930, p.1068.]
＊52 Ekonomisuto, 15 July, 1930, p.102. [(Economist Japanese), 15 July, 1930, p.102.]
＊53 Kaizo, July 1930, p.18. [Social Reform, July, 1930, p.18.]
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described the Social Bureau’s unemployment data as ‘extremely inaccurate and not 
worthy of consideration’ at the 58th Imperial Diet held on 26 April 1930. ＊54  Home Oﬃce 
Minister, Adachi, again admitted that the data were ‘imperfect’.＊55
 Faced with such criticisms the Social Bureau prepared an internal memorandum for 
the Home Oﬃce Minister in an eﬀort to bring some perspective to the issue claiming: 
 The Monthly Estimation on Unemployment Condition is a survey merely based on estimations 
by the heads of local authorities. The results cannot necessarily be regarded as precise. On 
the other hand, the Census Survey on 1st October this year is based on a direct investigation 
of unemployment and can comparatively be regarded as accurate. According to this, the total 
number of the unemployed in our country is 322,527. ＊56
 Minister Adachi was struck by the small diﬀerence in the unemployment returns in 
the Census and the data prepared by the Social Bureau, announcing to the 59th Imperial 
Diet on 28 January 1931 that the available statistical returns were plausible enough to 
justify current unemployment policy. ＊57
 Labour market observers in Japan remained sceptical of such bold assertions.  The 
Social Bureau provided no analysis of why or how the Census returns might capture 
the extent of unemployment any more accurately than previous surveys, or any sense 
of what more was needed to provide anything like a fraction of the relevant data 
produced in other countries on the scale, duration and characteristics of the registered 
unemployed.
 
＊54  ‘Dai 58 Kai Tekoku Gikai Shugiin Giji Sokkiroku Dai 3 Go’, Kanpo Gogai, 26 April 1930, 
p.36. [‘Stenographic Records of 58th Imperial Diet, Commons, Number 3’, The Oﬃcial Ga-
zette, Special Edition, 26 April 1930, p.36.]
＊55 Ibid., p.39.
＊56  Shakaikyoku, Dai 59 Kai Teikokugikai ni okeru Naimudaijin Touben Shiryo (Shitsugyo 
Mondai), Sakusei Nen Gappi Fumei (Suitei 1930 Nen). [Social Bureau, Material for the Min-
ister of the Home Oﬃce’s Explanation at the 59th Imperial Diet (Unemployment Problem), 
No Date (Presumably 1930).
＊57  ‘Dai 59 Kai Tekoku Gikai Shugiin Giji Sokkiroku Dai 7 Go’, Kanpo Gogai, 28 January 1931, 
pp.137-138. [‘Stenographic Records of 59th Imperial Diet, Commons, Number 7’, The Oﬃ-
cial Gazette, Special Edition, 28 January 1931, pp.137-138.]
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 In his assessment of the official unemployment returns Kase has noted that the 
methods of calculating unemployment differed from one prefecture to another with 
local authorities defining unemployment according to which groups of workers they 
felt were most in need of ameliorative action. ＊58 The diﬃculty was that although the 
prefectures could choose their methods of estimation, they frequently relied on the 
unreliable base figures derived from the 1925 survey of the unemployed and upon 
returns from Employment Exchanges.  The latter were a woefully inadequate indicator 
of labour market trends in general since they were incapable of recording the state of 
employment in agricultural areas. ＊59
Such criticism apart, the Social Bureau monthly returns have over the years continued 
to be used as an indicator of the trend of unemployment in interwar Japan.‘Many 
criticisms of these unemployment rates have been levelled’, writes Hashimoto,‘on 
the grounds that they probably underestimated the number unemployed. I think such 
criticisms are plausible but the changes in the unemployment rate themselves reﬂect 
the change of balance in demand and supply in labour market.’＊60  The contemporary 
scholar Minoguchi was likewise critical of the precision of the data but argued for 
their acceptance as a general reflection of labour market trends. ＊61 The Bureau’s 
unemployment estimates based on these monthly returns were used in the Year-Book of 
Labour Statistics published by the International Labour Oﬃce to reﬂect the general level 
of unemployment in Japan during the 30s. ＊62  The returns are detailed below: 
 It was on the basis of these data that the International Labour Oﬃce reported the 
unemployment situation of Japan in considerable detail. A review of 1937 noted:
 As at 31 December 1936, it is estimated that there were 322,969 persons without work in 
 
＊58  Kase, K.,‘Senzen Nihon no Shitugyo Tokei -Situgyo Jokyo Suitei Geppo no Shinpyosei-’, 
Tokyo Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyusho, Shakai Kagaku Kenkyu, Vol. XLVIII, No.5, 
March 1997. [Kase,K.,‘Consideration of the Unemployment Statistics in Prewar Japan 
-The Credibility of the Monthly Estimation Report on Unemplosyment’, Institute of Social 
Science, University of Tokyo,  Journal of Social Science, Vol. XLVIII, No.5, March 1997.]
＊59  Kase, op.cit., pp.156-157.
＊60  Hashimoto, J., Kyokoka no Nihon Shihonsyugi, Tokyo, 1984, p.292. [Hashimoto,J., Japanese 
Capitalism under the Great Depression, Tokyo, 1984, p.292.]
＊61 Minoguchi, T., op.cit., pp. 45-48.
＊62 International Labour Oﬃce, The Year-Book of Labour Statistics, 1937-1940.
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comparison with 359,636 in January 1936, or a decrease of 36,667 persons. The ratio between 
the number of persons unemployed and the total number of employed persons was 4.08 per 
cent. At the end of 1936 the unemployed were classiﬁed as follows: salaried employees 65,501, 
casual workers 154,939, all others 102,529. In the group classiﬁed as “all others” the decrease in 
unemployment is the most noticeable, owing to recent activities in industries connected with the 
manufacture of munitions. ＊63
 In spite of serious doubts expressed at the time about the credibility of the Social 
Bureau monthly returns from September 1929 they have continued to be used over 
the years as a representative reflection of labour market conditions at the time. It 
was on the basis of such returns that Blumenthal judged the absolute number of the 
unemployed to be roughly the same in the two depression periods, about 1 million 
workers. Since the size of the labour force had almost doubled between the two events 
the unemployment rate was considerably higher in 1930s. ＊64 Blumenthal’s comparison 
of economic depression in Japan in the 1930s and 1970s portrays the situation thus:
Table 9  Unemployment in Japan, 1929-1938 (International Labour Oﬃce)
Year
Japan












International Labour Oﬃce, Year-Book of Labour Statistics, 1937-1940, p.46.  
The ILO ﬁgures diﬀer slightly from the Social Bureau’s returns because 
the ILO averaged its ﬁgures using diﬀerent monthly starting dates.
 
＊63  ‘Unemployment Statistics in Japan’, Industrial and Labour Information, 1937, p. 475.
＊64  Blumenthal, T.,‘Depressions in Japan: the 1930s and the 1970s’, in Dore, R., and Sinha, R., 
Japan and World Depression, New York, 1987, pp.69-71.
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 It is a reflection of the paucity of alternative unemployment data that the Social 
Bureau’s returns should continue to be used so extensively given that contemporary 
oﬃcials were always keen to point out their deﬁciencies. Kawanishi, a bureaucrat in the 
Social Bureau in the 1930s, has recollected:
 We began the Monthly Estimation of the Unemployment Condition because Mr Yoshida, 
the Head of Social Bureau, could not answer in cabinet the question of how many people were 
unemployed. Therefore we ordered local governors to estimate the number monthly and report 
the results to the Social Bureau. However when a conference of prefecture representatives was 
held, Mr Ariyoshi from Aichi complained that it was almost impossible to provide such estimates 
with any great conﬁdence. ＊65
 Given what we have noted so far, it is understandable why politicians and observers 
of the interwar Japanese economy were far from clear as to the extent of the 
unemployment problem and why subsequent historians have continued for so long to 
adopt rather uncritically near contemporary data which was far from robust even when 
oﬀered for public consumption.  It is only when we return to the concept of the dual 
labour market to which we drew attention earlier with reference to Odaka’s re-working 
of the Census data that a clearer perspective can be obtained.
 
＊65  ‘Senzen no Rodo Gyosei wo Kataru -Zadan Kai-, Rodo Gyosei Shi Dai 1 Kan Yoroku, 
1961, p.24. [‘Memories of the Labour Administration in Prewar Japan’, the Record of the 
Symposium, collected in Ministry of Labour, The History of Labour Administration, Supple-
ment of Vol.1, 1961, p.24.]









Adapted from Blumenthal, T.,‘Depressions in Japan : the 1930s and the 
1970s’, in Dore, R., and Shinha, R., Japan and the World Depression,  New 
York, 1987, p.70.  (For the 1930s the years are 1929-1933, for the 1970s, 
1973-1977.)
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 So far as overall unemployment during the Great Depression is concerned, Sato 
estimates that employment in manufacturing industry as a whole declined by 7% during 
1929 and 1931. ＊66  With the labour force in non-primary industry increasing by 4% 
to just fewer than seven million, about one million were judged to be unemployed or 
around 1.2 million if the 400,000 regarded as frictionally unemployed are added and the 
100,000 employed on ‘relief’ public construction are subtracted. ＊67  This is far fewer 
than the ﬁgure of three million unemployed which is sometimes adopted when referring 
to employment in large manufacturing ﬁrms only. ＊68   
 The difficulty with all such re-evaluations, however, is that they frequently focus 
upon the manufacturing sector employing more than 50 people which was itself 
more sensitive than other sectors in terms of employment in a depression.   Once the 
traditional sector including agriculture is accounted for unemployment estimates fall but 
the potential for a growing unemployment rate is considerable, given that the marginal 
productivity of workers in agriculture, domestic industries and service is invariably low. 
Sato claims that the added value of productivity per worker in Japan’s primary sector 
in 1929 was just one-fourth of that of the manufacturing sector. ＊69 
 What needs emphasising, therefore, is the plight of small firms and agriculture. 
During the 1920s large ﬁrms in the heavy industry sectors adopted strong employment 
relationships with their core skilled workers whilst also employing ‘temporary’ workers 
who could be discharged at will.  This latter group competed with workers in small 
ﬁrms or in areas where the element of skill did not need to be so carefully protected, 
 
＊66  Sato, K.,‘Senkanki Nihon no Macro-Keizai to Micro-keizai’, in Nakamura., T., ed., Senkanki 
no Nihonkeizai Bunseki, Tokyo, 1981, p.16. [Sato, K.,‘The Macro-Economy and the Micro-
Economy of the Interwar Years’, The Interwar Japanese Economy, Tokyo, 1981, p.16.]
＊67  Yasuba, Y.,‘The Japanese Economy and Economic Policy in the 1930s’, Paciﬁc Economic 
Papers, No. 138, 1986, p.180
＊68  For detailed discussion of this point see Blumenthal, T., ‘Senkanki no Nihon Keizai ‒Sono 
Kokusai Hikaku‒’, in Nakamura, T., ed., Senkanki no Nihon Keizai Bunseki, Tokyo, 1981, 
pp.32-51. [Blumenthal. T.,‘The Interwar Japanese Economy in International Comparative 
Perspective’, in T., ed., The Interwar Japanese Economy, Tokyo, 1981, pp.32-51.]
＊69  Sato, K.,‘“Dai Fukyoki” no Nihon Keizai’, Hitotsubashi Daigaku Keizai Kenkyusho hen, 
Keizai Kenkyu, vol.27, No.1, January 1976, pp.4-5. [Sato, K.,‘Japanese Economy under the
“Great Depression”’, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, The Eco-
nomic Review, vo..27, No.1, January 1976, pp.4-5.]
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such as in silk reeling or cotton spinning.  During the 1929-31 contraction the heavy 
industry sector discharged their ‘temporary’ workers who then competed with new 
entrants to the labour market for work in small ﬁrms or in the primary sector. ＊70 
4  Conclusion
 Labour market conditions in Japan before 1940 were viewed essentially as a part of 
a wider consideration of poverty and social trends. The concepts of ‘unemployment’ 
or ‘the unemployed’ were not common. The Webbs’ visit to Japan before World War 
I introduced Japanese bureaucrats to eﬀorts then being made by British observers to 
distinguish between poverty and unemployment arising from changes in the organization 
and structure of industries, themselves a product of the vagaries of the trade cycle. 
However, we must not exaggerate the influence of the Webbs since little distinction 
was made in Japan before the end of the World War I between those in poverty and 
those thrown out of work involuntarily. Towards the end of the First World War there 
was some limited discussion of the likelihood of unemployment arising from wartime 
dislocation and the threat of inflation. Officials expressed concerns about the absence 
of any speciﬁc unemployment data and were receptive to the recommendation of the 
International Labour Office that the problem of unemployment should be subject to 
systematic investigation. 
 Even so, the principal motivation of the Japanese government in undertaking limited 
surveys of the unemployment problem was to indicate the likelihood of social unrest as 
unemployment loomed during the interwar period. Data derived from the Unemployment 
Statistical Survey of 1925 and the 1930 Census revealed relatively low unemployment 
rates but there was no effort made to capture the complexity of the labour market. 
Contemporary critics were aware that such crude data failed to capture issues such as 
over-employment and the capacity of many individuals out of work to escape any survey 
count whatsoever. There was some oﬃcial recognition of such deﬁciencies in the decision 
from 1929 to initiate monthly returns on the numbers unemployed in each prefecture. 
Despite the fact that these data were also considerably fraught both in method and 
coverage they nonetheless quickly became regarded as representative of the trend of 
unemployment in 1930s Japan. They were adopted by contemporary labour organization, 
 
＊70 Yasuba, op.cit., pp.180-1.
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reproduced often without any amendment or explanation of their dubiousness, and as 
such publicised to the world the low rate of unemployment in Japan. Reworking by later 
scholars such as Odaka, anxious to stress the existence of the dual economy, merely 
altered the aggregate unemployment rate marginally from that originally estimated by 
the Social Bureau, even though attention was drawn to the fact that such a rate ignored 
the ‘hidden unemployed’. 
 Japan’s interwar labour market, akin to that of France, encompassed isolated 
workers who had irregular employment or who had several jobs, and the self-employed. 
Regulation of such work was to some extent under the control of the individual 
and therefore did not take the form of unemployment as generally conceived. More 
significantly, many small businesses incorporated implicit long term ‘contracts’ 
with their workers based on a paternalistic approach whereby partial or even total 
unemployment was self-managed by the trade. Moreover, earlier phases of rural 
industrialization had avoided the creation of a wage-earning class strictly defined so 
that the agricultural environment was able to cope with variations in a number of 
jobs without creating unemployment.  Rural areas were able to be exploited by the 
unemployed in the city areas as a safety valve, enabling those thrown out of work by 
economic downturns to ‘disappear’ from the labour market. 
 What primary and near primary material exists has not permitted the creation of 
any alternative unemployment series for interwar Japan which substantially improves 
upon the data developed between the wars. None the less, on the basis of the available 
evidence, we have drawn attention to the paucity of contemporary data, how it lead 
to spasmodic attempts at improving the unemployment count, and to the sources of 
monthly data upon which aggregate figures were produced and have been used by 
scholars since. Signiﬁcant here, of course, is the fact that Japan never adopted a uniform 
set of national regulations governing provision of unemployment assistance and therefore 
lacked the ﬂow of information available to other nations whose unemployment situation 
has subsequently been analysed with greater confidence and with superior levels of 
disaggregation.

